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In rfhe S11preme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,

Respondent,
vs.

D~LE

GILBERT LOPEZ,

Case No.

11272
Appellant,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
The appellant, Dale Gilbert Lopez, appeals from
u conviction in the Seventh Judicial District Court,
-:::arbon County, State of Utah, for the crime of secA1d degree burglary.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was charged by information with
:he crime of burglary in the second degree. Al:hough appellant demanded a jury trial, he subselUently requested that the jury be discharged and
'ne matter was heard March 7, 1968, by the Honor~:;le Henry Ruggeri, Seventh Judicial District, and
';;pellant was found guilty. Sentence was imposed

2
March 15, 1968, confining the appellant in the Utai_
State Prison for a term as provided by law of nc:less than one nor more than twenty years.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the judgment o
the Seventh Judicial District Court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent, State of Utah, submits the fo:
lowing statement of facts as being more in keepinCJ
with the rule that evidence will be reviewed on appeal in a light most favorable to the trial court's determination.
At approximately 3:30 a.m. on the mormnq ,Saturday. January 27, 1968, Duane Jensen, one c:
the state's witnesses, observed a 1957 Ford four-due
sedan coast to a stop across the road from the Betr
Buy Market, located in Price, Utah (T. 78-79). II~
watched as the occupant left the car, crossed thf
street and, while looking back over his shoulde
scanned the immediate vicinity (T. 79). After crossing the street, the individual, wearing a dark kneclength coat_. entered the parking area of the st( I'
(T. 80). Jensen watched for ten minutes, then pr::
pared to retire. l-:Iowever, he notified police to chcc.the store when he noticed that the car was gonP.
1

Patrolman Glenn Peterson arrived at apprc
mately 4:22 a.m. and discovered that a store v
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do·N had been broken (T. 85). He then notified the
storeowner, Charles Bezvack and, while awaiting
the arrival of the owner, he noticed that the door at
the rear of the store was unlocked (T. 87).
When Mr. Bezy0ck arrived at about 4:30 a.m.,
he and the officer entered the store and the owner
discovered that his cash box containing approximately $84 in rolls of quarters, dimes, nickels and
pennies was missing (T. 92). Insufficient fund checks
left in said box were also gone. Bezyack noticed that
:he cover over the meat counter had been disturbed
(T. 96). The following morning, a clerk informed Mr.
Bezyack that several cartons of cigarettes were missing (T. 95).

About 8:00 p.m. Saturday evening, January 27,
1968, appellant was driving a 1957 Ford four-door
sedan when, in attempting to pass another car, he
hit an ice spot and skidded off the road. He was then
1.:iken by a motorist to the Sheriff's Office where
the appellant submitted to an alcohol test (T. 31).
Subsequently, Deputy Sheriff Charles Semken,

Jr., spoke with the appellant and advised him of his

rights linder the Miranda decision.
Appellant chose to converse with the deputy (T. 41).
The deputy asked appellant where he was living,
;f the officers could inspect the room, and where the
~eys to the room were at that time. Appellant said
:he deputy could 1001: in his room, told him where
·+ ' ATas and where he could find the keys (T. 42).
~onstitutional

1

Subsequently, Charles Bezyack and Deputy
:is-riff Keith Hansen went to appellant's motel room.
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While there they found, between the mattress dr.
the box spr:ngs, eight cartons of cigarettes. In
closet hidden under some clothes and a cardbo,1E
box they found rolls of qlJarters, nickels, dimes anr
pennies (T. 44). They then started for Price from Wsi
lington where the appellant's motel was loca\e6.
About a half mile west of Wellington they found ths
cash box lying alonqside the road. By the cash boY '
was the tray to the box and a bill from the Betr-Bm·
Market (T. 45).
The deputy and Mr. Bezyack then went back le
the sheriff's office. The deputy spoke to appellwt
telling him what thev had discovered. Appellan:
asked if there was some way he could pay for the
things (T. 45). Later Mr. Bezyack came into the roorr,
The appellant said, "Charlie, I am sorry." He said.
"I would like to pay you for all the damages. I can
pay you as soon as I get my income tax check
back." (T. 46).
Appellant was asked about the checks and he
said he thought that he had thrown them out n.L
together (T. 46). These checks were subsequently
found.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE APPELLANT WAS ARRESTED FOR GOOl 1
CAUSE ALTHOUGH WITHOUT A WARRANT ANP
THE SUBSEQUENT SEARCH WAS INCIDENTAL 'f('
A LAWFUL ARREST.

Utah Code Ann.

§

77-13-3 (1953) outlines tl"I?

1
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:uirernents for arrest Vlithout a warrant in part as
'.dlows:
(2) When the person arrested has committed a
felony, ulthough not in his presence.
(3) Vilhen 3 felony has in fact been committed,
and he has reci.rnnable cause for believing the person arrested to have committed it.
( 4) On a charge. made upon reasonable caase, of
the commission of a felony by the person arrested.

(5) At night, when there is a reasonable cause to
believe that he has committed a felony.

Although the appellant voluntarily appeared at
1:te Sheriff's Office in connection with the automobile incident and submitted to an alcohol test which
:,1dicated that he was not intoxicated, this does not
::impel an inescapable conclusion that he was en,t!led to be released and that his detention was un'.::wvful. In fact, a felony had been committed in the
·-:;mmunity Jess than t-vventy-four hours before the
1ppellant was questioned at the Sheriff's Office and
',.s car involved in the accident fit the vehicle de'~·nbed by the witness to the burglary, Duane Jen,sn. These two factors are sufficient to lead to a
:-:'.)sitive conclusion regarding the existence of prob'cle or reasonable cause as required by the statute
=1ted above. Contrary to the assertion in the appel~nt' s brief that the arrest occurred in connection
·:1th the accident, it is apparent that the identity of
'.'(' 'JGhicles alone was sufficient to establish a firm
,.-,': between the appellant and the felony in ques-
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tion, thereby confirming the legality of the arresr
procedure.
The appellant's brief cites the case of Henry v.
U.S .. 361 U.S. 98 (1959) to support the contention tha.
the detention of the appellant under the circumstances was illegal and a violation of his rights under Utah Const. art. I, § 7 and the U.S. Const. arneno
XIV. However, the Court pointed out in that case:
Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances
known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense had been committed....
And while a search without warrant is, within
limits, permissible if incident to a lawful arrest, if
an arrest without a warrant is to support an incidental search, it must be made with probable cause.
Henry v. U.S.~ supra, at P.102-3.

In the instant case, the identity of the vehicles
was sufficient to warrant a conclusion as to prob·
able or reasonable cause both as to the arrest anc'l.
subsequent search. To conclude otherwise wou 0
unduly hinder the police investigatory activity, par
ticularly where evidence has already been un·
earthed suggesting the existence of articles direct
ly related to the incident in question.
1

Furthermore, the search in this instance w 0 ~
clearly incidental to the arrest in accordance witr
the test established in Agnello v. United States, 269
U.S. 20 (1925) and reiterated in Stoner v. California,
376 U.S. 483 (1964), which in essence requires th 2'
the search be substantially contemporaneous v:it!the arrest and confined to the immediate vicin 1'
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Of more importance, in the case of McDonald v.
United States. 307 F.2.d 272 (10th Cir. 1962), the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's
finding that the appellant, while in custody, gave
his free and voluntary consent to the search of his
automobile. Despite the existence of conflicting
testimony on the issue of consent, the appellate
court upheld the denial of the Motion to Suppress,
holding that it was unable to conclude as a matter
of law that such a finding was erroneous. In a similar instance, it was held that the relinquishing of car
keys by the accused was tantamount to consent to
the subsequent search of the vehicle. Robinson v.
United States, 325 F. 2d 880 (5th Cir. 1964). Furthermore, there is little evidence of intimidation or coercion which would initiate the volition of the required consent, which was given in this case both
'Nith respect to the automobile and the motel room.
POINT II
THE APPELLANT KNO,VINGLY AND PURPOSEFULLY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL AS
REQUIRED BY STATUTE, I.E., IN OPEN COURT AND
ENTERED IN THE MINUTES.

Utah Code Ann.

§

77-27-2 (1953) provides:

Issues of fact must be tried by a jury, but in all
cases except where a sentence of death may be imposed trial by jury may be waived by the defendant.
Such waiver shall be made in open court and entered in the minutes.

The effect of this section is to abrogate the com'·1cm l::i.w rule that '.:me accused of a felony may not
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waive his right to a jury trial. In the case of Barlow
et al. v. Young, Sheriff, 108 Utah 523, 161 P.2d 927
(1945), the Utah Supreme Court held that the pc:t:
tioners had effectively waived their right to a. jury
trial although the stipulations were signed by coun
sel and not the defendants since they were presen'.
and fully aware of the implications of the waiver
and the contents of the stipulations. In a concurring
opinion, Chief Justice Larsen commented concerning the role of counsel under these circumstanceE
as follows:
... may counsel, in open court and in the presence
of his cJient, waive a jury or enter a stipulation as
to evidence which is binding on the client? That
this question calls for an affirmative answer seems
clear. In the conduct and trial of a lawsuit, the attorney is not a servant or mere agent of his client.
He is the general manager, the expert director of
the business in hand. It is his judgment and not the
judgment or whim of the client that controls the
litigation. The attorney is the agent or helper of the
court. His duty to the court is superior to that due
the client. His obligation runs to the public as well
as to the individiual. He has no moral right to prolong trials and litigation by trifling or dilatory tactics or resort to the subterfuge of trying to wear out
his opponent just to suit the whim or anger of his
client ....

The statements of the court in this regard aT'?
particularly relevant to the instant case wherP tho:
appellant asserts that he was unconstitutionally dt::
prived of his right to a jury trial. The record ir::-
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:::ates considerable conflict as to the defendant's
statements regarding the presence of a jury (See
R. 70). Under these circumstances it was not unreasonable and indeed was essential for counsel to
act on his behalf. Furthermore, it is within the trial
:::cmrt' s discretion to discharge the jury pursuant to
the submission of stipulations as to issues of fact.
POINT III
THE ADMISSION OF TESTIMONY AS TO APPEL-

1,ANT'S POSSESSION OF STOLEN ARTICLES WAS

PERMISSIBLE AND EVEN IF IT WAS ERRONEOUS,
IT DID NOT AFFECT THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF
THE DEFENDANT.

As is noted in appeJlant' s brief, the generally
;1/Tepted rule precludes the admission in a criminal
trial of evidence of other similar offenses. This proposition was upheld by the Utah Supreme Court in
State v. Leek, 85 Utah 531, 34 P.2d 1091 (1934), where
the court reversed and remanded a forgery convict1on after the trial court admitted into evidence, over
objection, two other checks supposedly endorsed
CJ.t the same time as the check in question but pay:ible at different times and places. However, one of
the instanc6s in which the exception to the exclusionary rule comes into play occurs when the evi1ence sought to be introduced is intimately con'lC!cted with trial issues.
Evidence of possession of other prnpe;.'t:v by Cle L1efendant may be admissible because it is found in
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such close connection with the property involved
in the cri!ne charged that evidence regarding it is
inseparable from evidence of possession of the property charged in the indictment, or because the fact
appears incidentally and naturally in showing the
whole t:·ansaction conci:orning the property involved
in the pros~cution. Evidence of the possession of
other property than that involved in the prosecutioi1 is frequently admitted for the purpose of showing the intent of the defendant in doing the particular act chargc'd az'.1inst him as a crime, or to prove
scienter, or guilty or criminal knowledge with respect to the crime charged, or as tending to show
that such crim9 was n part of a system of criminal
acts. (Emphasis added.) 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence
§ ~90 at P. 336 ( 1967).

Under the circumstances of this particular casG
it was not unreasonable for Officer Semken to ques
tion the appellant concerning the latter's possession
of the fruits of other recent and unsolved crimes.
There was no abuse of discretion by the trial cou~:
1n admitting such evidence during cross ex:amino
tion where counsel for the appellant had previous]-,
opened the subject of the conversation between the
appellant c.nd Semken on direct examination. Thi~
appears to have been the basis for admitting thF
evidence in question since, when appellant's cot'r.
sel registered h!s obiection. the court stated, " ... \f<,
objection is overruJed. You opened up this subjc:c·
The objection is overruled." (R. 35).
Furthermore, th8 fact that the evidence in qut:":c
tion was msntion0d at only one point durinq fh
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ria.1 is indicative of its appearance " ... incidental-

:y a.nd naturally in showing the whole transc_;ctiun .... " 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence, supra.

Utah Code Ann.

§

77-42-1 ( l953) provides:

After hearing an qppeal the court must give judgment without regard to errors or defects which do
not affect the substantial rights of the parties. If
error has been committed, it shall not be presumed
to have resulted in prejudice. The court must be
satisfied that it has that effect before it is warranted in reversing the judgment.

It is submitted that even if the admission of such
Jral testimony was erroneous, it did not affect the

'substantial rights" of the appellant. State v. Romero. 42 Utah 46, 128 P. 530 (1912); State v. Estes, 52
Utah 572, 176 P. 271 (1918).
CONCLUSION

Tho facts in the instant case amply demonstrate
::1:it the trial court acted properly in finding appel..:Jnt guilty of the crime charged. The legal claims of
"rror on which the appellant relies for reversal are
',\hout merit. The arrest, search and seizure pro?rJures followed in the instant case were made with
::,· ~'bable cause and in the belief that the appellant
committed the burglarv in question. Waiver of
·,;_ )ury trial by appellant's counsel through stipula:--i:.; Clf fact was appropriate under the circum-
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stances and, therefore, this court should affirm ths
District Court's judgment.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY, JR
Attorney General
JOSEPH P. McCARTHY
Assistant Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent

